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NOTES
Hodgson and Akron IH The Supreme Court's New
Standard for Minor's Abortion Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the Supreme Court's recent recognition of a greater
state interest in regulating abortions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,' the debate surrounding the permissible range of
regulations that restrict the fundamental right to an abortion will
intensify and might overshadow even the abortion issue itself. As
legislatures begin to legislate these peripheral issues, the scope of
their power to infringe upon the still fundamental right to an
abortion will become a critical issue for the courts. The Supreme
Court recently mooted some of this debate and clarified an unset-
tled area of the law by defining the limits on the state's power to
require parental notification prior to a minor obtaining an abor-
tion.
Since the Supreme Court decided Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti
if), 2 state legislatures have grappled with the formidable task of
drafting a constitutional parental notification statute. Bellotti II
only established the requirement that a state provide a minor seek-
ing an abortion with a 'Judicial bypass" proceeding whereby she
could avoid parental notification. The Court provided no guid-
ance on the nature or type of proceeding necessary to comport
with due process. The characteristics of the bypass proceeding
have thus become the focal point of the debate surrounding the
parental notification issue.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions provided the much
needed guidance. The Court's decision in Minnesota v. Hodgson3
reaffirmed the Bellotti 11 requirement of the bypass proceeding
and invalidated the Minnesota law to the extent that the law did
not make bypass available to the minor. Also, the Court's decision
in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron 11)' over-
1 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2 443 U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotli Ill.
3 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
4 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990) [hereinafter Akron II).
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turned the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's finding of six separate
constitutional infirmities in an Ohio statutory bypass proceeding.
The Court's analysis of the Ohio notification statute will be im-
mensely helpful in defining the extent to which the bypass pro-
ceeding can burden or delay a minor's right to obtain an abor-
tion.
This Comment reviews the case law since Roe v. Wade5 that
has focused on the minor's right to an abortion in part II, nar-
rowing the issue to the adequacy of the statutory bypass proceed-
ing in satisfying due process. Part III of the Comment outlines
the background of Hodgson and Akron II by discussing the statutes
in question and the procedural history of each case. Part IV of
the Comment then analyzes each decision and provides an over-
view of the current state of the law in light of the decisions. The
Comment concludes, in part V, with a brief forecast of how the
Supreme Court may view the minor's right to an abortion in the
future and how strictly states may regulate minors' abortions.
II. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AND A MINOR'S RIGHT TO AN
ABORTION
The Supreme Court recognized in 1973 that the constitution-
al right to privacy, extrapolated from a line of cases dating back
to 1891, 6 guarantees a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
through abortion. The Court declared that the right to privacy
protects only those rights "deemed 'fundamental' or 'implied' in
the concept of ordered liberty"8 and the right to privacy "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy."9 While the Roe v. Wade decision found the woman's
constitutional right to privacy guarantees her right to an abortion,
the Court held this right to abortion not absolute and stated that
a state interest may "[a]t some point in [the] pregnancy ... be-
come sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
that govern the abortion decision."" After Roe v. Wade, the con-
troversy centered on what regulations states may. promulgate with-
out unduly restricting the woman's right to an abortion.
5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 153.
8 Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
9 Id. at 153.
10 Id. at 154. The Court noted compelling state interests "in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." Id.
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One particular source of controversy has been the right of a
minor to seek an abortion and the state's ability to regulate that
right by requiring the minor to obtain parental consent or, alter-
natively, to notify her parents of the pending abortion. The Court
has held that constitutional protections apply equally to minors."
Although the Court has recognized that "[c]onstitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority," 2 the Court has also held that
"the status of minors under the law is unique in many re-
spects.""3 The question presented then is the extent to which a
state may regulate a minor's abortion decision through parental
consent/notification requirements without infringing upon the
minor's fundamental right to obtain an abortion. The courts have
struggled to accommodate the minor's constitutional rights and
the state's interests in protecting minors.
A. Striking Down an Absolute Parental Veto: Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth 4
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality pa-
rental consent statutes in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth. The Missouri statute at issue in Danforth required an
unmarried female under eighteen years of age to obtain the con-
sent of one parent or person in loco parentis prior to seeking an
abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 5 The Court
struck down the statutory provision requiring the consent, holding
that "the State may not impose a blanket provision, such as Sec. 3
(4), requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as
a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor." 6
The Court's decision in Danforth stemmed from the finding
that the state itself cannot regulate the abortion decision during
the first- trimester; "therefore, the state does not have the consti-
tutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision ... to terminate the ... preg-
nancy."'7 The Danforth Court recognized that minors receive con-
11 See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
and In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri V. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1975).
13 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979).
14 Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975).
15 Id. at 58.
16 Id. at 74.
17 Id.
1990)
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stitutional protection similar to adults; however, the Court also
acknowledged that states may govern minors with a different legal
standard than adults." In consideration of the states' broader
mandate for regard to minors, the Court discussed whether any
compelling state interest existed to require parental consent for a
minor's abortion.' Finding none, the Court concluded that the
Missouri statute unconstitutionally allowed for the possibility of an
absolute parental veto.2' The Court prefaced the holding by stat-
ing that the decision was not to suggest eveiy minor has the capa-
bility to give effective consent to an abortion. The Court left un-
decided questions concerning when a minor is able to give effec-
tive consent and, if the minor cannot consent, whether any other
mechanism is available for the minor to have an abortion.
B. Providing a Model for Parental Consent Statutes and a Minor's
Right to an Abortion: Bellotti v. Baird2'
Three years after its decision in Danforth, the Supreme Court
once again addressed the parental consent issue and minors' abor-
tion rights in Bellotti 11.22 The Massachusetts statute at issue in
Bellotti II required parental consent prior to a minor's abortion.
This statute went further than the Missouri statute in Danforth by
permitting the minor to obtain judicial consent where the parents
refused to give consent. The statute provided that "consent may
be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good
cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. ' 2' The
Supreme Court, observing that the statute "was susceptible of a
construction that 'would void or substantially modify the federal
constitutional challenge to the statute,"'24 vacated the district
court ruling and certified nine questions pertaining to the statute
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.25
The paramount issues that the Massachusetts court consid-
ered centered on how the court should determine if the minor
may have the abortion and also when the minor may proceed
with seeking judicial consent in lieu of parental consent. The
18 Id.
19 See generally Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 329 (1987-88).
20 Id.
21 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622,622.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 625.
24 Id. at 628 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976)).
25 Id. at 628-29.
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Massachusetts court interpreted the statute as requiring the court
to consider the minor's best interests even where the court finds
the minor is capable of making a sound decision concerning the
abortion. The court also held that "[a]s a general rule, a minor
who desires an abortion may not obtain judicial consent without
first seeking both parents' consent."26
The Supreme Court struck down the Massachusetts statute,
holding that, where state regulations require parental consent, the
regulation must provide an alternative judicial procedure whereby
the minor may proceed without first seeking parental consent.
The minor, the Court stated further, must be permitted to show:
1) that she is mature enough to intelligently make a decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy; and/or 2) the abortion
would be in her best interest. Should the minor persuade the
court of her maturity and capability to make such a decision, the
court could not look any further and must permit the abor-
tion." Should the court find the minor immature but also find
the abortion in her best interests, the court may again permit the
abortion.2 The Court found that parental consent statutes are
not per se unconstitutional29 as long as the judicial bypass pro-
cedure is part of the statute.30 The Bellotti II decision thus pro-
vided a blueprint for future parental consent statutes.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of a statutory parental
consent requirement in Planned Parenthood Association v.
Ashcroft."1 The statute coupled the consent requirement with an
alternative judicial bypass proceeding. The Court found the re-
quirements consistent with those announced by the Bellotti II deci-
sion, and provided further guidance on the bypass proceeding
requirements. Although the statute required the name and ad-
dress of each parent, 2 the Court found the statute preserved
anonymity by requiring the minor to complete the court petition
by using only her initials.3 " The statute also preserved the expe-
diency required by Bellotti I" by mandating a hearing on the
minor's petition within five days of filing, notice of appeal within
26 Id. at 630.
27 Id. at 646-47.
28 Id. at 648.
29 Id. at 649.
30 Id.
31 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
32 Id. at 479 n.4.
33 Id. at 491 n.16.
34 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 644.
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twenty-four hours of the judge's decision, and completion of the
record for appeal within five days. 5
C. Constitutionality of Parental Notiflcation Statutes: H.L. v.
Matheson
H.L. v. Matheson" questioned the constitutionality of a stat-
ute requiring only notice to .the parents and not parental consent
to a minor's abortion. The Court's ruling narrowly focused on the
appellant before it, holding the statute constitutional where appli-
cable only to immature minors. 7
The Utah statute in question required the minor's physician
to "notify if possible" the minor's parents or legal guardian 8
The minor appellant challenged the statute's constitutionality
claiming the statute was overly broad in that it includes all unmar-
ried minors regardless of maturity. 9 The Court did not reach
that issue and decided the case solely on the basis of the
appellant's immaturity. The Matheson Court's deference set the
stage for the Akron II decision.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT CASES
A. The Minor's Consent to Health Services Act and Hodgson
In 1981 the Minnesota Legislature amended its earlier
Minors' Consent to Health Services Act.4" This amendment be-
came Subdivisions 2 through 6 of Section 144.343 which governs
a minor's right to an abortion in Minnesota.4' The controversy
35 Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 476.
36 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
37 Id. at 401, 413.
38 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1974).
39 Matheson, 450 U.S. at 405.
40 Minor's Consent to Health Services Act, MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1981).
41 Subdivision 2 provides:
"No abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor...
until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered
in the manner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4."
Subdivision 3 provides:
"'[P]arent' means both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one
parent of the pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be
located through reasonably diligent effort . . . "
Subdivision 4 provides three exceptions for applying Subdivisions 2 and 3:
(a) . . . the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there
is insufficient time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by theperson or persons who are
entitled to notice: or
[Vol. 66:527
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surrounded subdivisions 2, 3 and 6 of the notification statute.
Subdivisions 2 and 3 required a mandatory forty-eight hour delay
between notification of both parents and performance of the abor-
tion, unless the minor alleged parental abuse and reported it to
the authorities.42 They included no. provisions for a Bellotti II ju-
dicial by-pass proceeding. Subdivision 6 provided that if the courts
enjoined enforcement of subdivision 2, a minor would be afford-
ed a judicial by-pass proceeding, however, all other notification
provisions would remain effective.4"
Two days before the statute's effective date, the plaintiffs"
in Hodgson filed suit seeking an injunction against enforcement of
the statute. Their complaint alleged that the statute violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.45
The Federal District Court of Minnesota, enjoined enforce-
ment of the entire statute. 6 It invalidated subdivision 2 because
it failed to provide the Bellotti 1I by-pass proceeding and it re-
quired a forty-eight hour mandatory waiting period.4 1 It also in-
validated subdivision 3 because it required two-parent notifica-
tion.48 Finally, it invalidated subdivision 6 because it incorporat-
ed the notification provisions of subdivisions 2 and 3.49 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, affirmed
the district court's invalidation of subdivision 2 because it failed
to 'comply with the mandate of Bellotti 11."° It reversed the
(c) the pregnant woman declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse, ne-
glect, or physical abuse . . .
and notice is given to the proper authorities.
Subdivision 5 makes the performance of an abortion acriminal offense if in viola-
tion of this section.
Subdivision 6 provides that if enforcement of subdivision2 is ever enjoined, then a
minor is entitled to a judicial by-pass proceeding. All other notification provisions of
subdivision 2 will remain in effect. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. This Comment does not address the nature of the Minnesota by-pass proceed-
ing. The Court's guidance regarding the adequacy of the proceeding is addressed in the
context of its Akron II decision.
44 Plaintiffs included two Minnesota doctors, four abortion clinics, six pregnant mi-
nors (as representatives of a class) and the mother of a pregnant minor. Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2934 (1990).
45 Id. The complaint also alleged several violations of the Minnesota Constitution.
Id. This Note addresses only United States Constitutional issues.
46 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D.Minn. 1986).
47 Id. at 773, 778.
48 Id. at 777.
49 Id. 777, 778.
50 853 F.2d 1452, 1456-57 (8th Cir. 1988). A three-judge panel first heard the case.
1990]
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court's invalidation of subdivisions 3 and 6 and approved the
forty-eight hour waiting period and the two-parent notification
requirement. 51 The plaintiffs appealed the Eighth Circuit's ruling.
B. Ohio House Bill 319 and Akron II
The suit in Akron II followed the passage of Ohio Amended
Substitute House Bill 319 (H.B. 319) by the Ohio Legislature.52
That statute required parental notification by a physician prior to
performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor. The statute
provided a judicial bypass procedure through which a minor
could avoid the parental notification requirement. In the proceed-
ing, a court would order the abortion if the minor proved that
she was sufficiently mature to make her own decision or the abor-
tion was otherwise in her best interest. 3 In addition, the bill es-
tablished procedural guidelines governing the bypass proceedings
from the minor's filing of a complaint through final appellate re-
view.54
Plaintiffs Akron Center for Reproductive Health, a physician
employed by the Center, and minors Patty Poe and Rachel Roe 5
filed suit on March 21, 1986. They asked the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio to declare certain
provisions of Ohio H.B. 319 unconstitutional and to enjoin their
enforcement. The plaintiffs' challenges focused primarily on the
bypass proceeding as opposed to the issue of notification per se.
The district court entered judgement in favor of the plaintiffs.-6
It held that various provisions of the law violated a minor's right
to due process under the fourteenth amendment by unduly bur-
dening her fundamental right to an abortion.5 Defendant
Slaby58 filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
Its decision was vacated and the court decided the case en bane.
51 853 F.2d at 1463, 1466.
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1985) [hereinafter Ohio H.B. 319).
53 Id. at § 2919(C)(1)(a).
54 Id. at § 2505.073.
55' Poe thought she might be pregnant and Roe was denied an abortion at the Cen-
ter by the operation of Ohio H.B. 319.
56 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio
1986).
57 The circuit court analyzed each of the six separate constitutional violations found
by the district court and affirmed the lower court. These violations were simply
judgement calls by the courts regarding what was an undue burden on a minor's right
to an abortion. To more clearly analyze the current status of the law, the lower courts'
rationale for these violations will be discussed in the context of the Supreme Court's re-
jection of each.
58 The original suit named as defendants prosecutors Gary Rosen and Lynn Slaby
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the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit analyzed each of the six sepa-
rate violations of due process found by the district court and af-
firmed the lower court's decision.59 The United States Supreme
Court reversed.
IV. HODOSON AND AKRON : TOWARD A MORE LIBERAL
STANDARD FOR PARENTAL NOTIFICATION STATUTES
This section discusses the Supreme Court's decisions in
Hodgson and Akron II and how the Court has liberalized the mini-
mum standard that parental notification statutes must surpass to
meet constitutional muster. The Hodgson analysis first examines
the Court's determination that the two-parent notification statute
had a detrimental affect on both the parents, and children. The
analysis continues with an exploration of the Court's finding that
this two-parent notification requirement furthers no legitimate
state interest. The Hodgson analysis concludes by examining the
Court's assertion that the availability of the judicial bypass pro-
ceeding saves the two-parent notification requirement. The Akron
II analysis looks at the six points that the, Sixth Circuit found
violated a minor's right to due process. The six points and the
Supreme Court's rejection of the Sixth Circuit's analysis are exam-
ined in the Akron II analysis.
A. Hodgson: Highlighting the Need for the ,Bypass Proceeding
The Supreme Court's ruling in Hodgson underscores the
Court's willingness to uphold restrictions on the availability of
abortions to minors. 0 Neither Hodgson nor Akron II provided the
Court an opportunity to examine the continued validity of Roe.
The Justices in Hodgson limited their analyses to the questions
presented by the issue of a minor's right to obtain an abortion. A
majority of the Court struck down that portion of the Minnesota
statute requiring a minor seeking an abortion to notify both par-
ents. Nonetheless, another majority ruled that the statutory provi-
sion providing a bypass proceeding should a minor wish to bypass
the parental notification requirement preserved the constitutional-
as well as Ohio's Attorney General and Governor. The State of Ohio intervened and
prosecuted the case on appeal.
59 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988).
60 Notwithstanding Roe, the Supreme Court has always held that a state may impose
greater limitations on a minor female giyen the responsibilities of a state to its minor
citizens.
1990]
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ity of the statute."1 The following analysis of the Hodgson deci-
sion suggests that the majority, by upholding subdivision 6 of the
statute, continued to balance the minor's privacy right to seek an
abortion with the state's interest in the health and safety of the
minor as well as the parental right to raise children free of state
interference. 2
1. The Two Parent Notification Requirement's Detrimental
Affects on Minors Seeking Abortions and Their Parents
The Stevens majority," in determining the validity of the
two parent notification requirement, reviewed the district court
findings of the impact of the two parent notification requirement
on the minor and the parents. The Stevens majority noted that
the findings were not previously challenged in the court of ap-
peals or before the Supreme Court.64 With the divorce rate near
fifty percent, the district court concluded that only fifty percent
of the minors in Minnesota live with both parents, nine percent
live with neither parent and thirty-three percent live with only one
parent.65 With those percentages as background, the district
court concluded that the two parent notification requirement was
harmful to those minors who did not live with both parents as
well as to the custodial and non-custodial parents.6
The Stevens majority approvingly cited the district court con-
clusion that the relationship between the non-custodial parent and
the minor often worsened after notification.6' The minor often
believes that notification will aid in reconciliation but the forced
notification more often than not leads to further alienation be-
tween the non-custodial parent and the minor.6' The district
court also noted that the custodial parent is adversely affected by
61 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
62 The Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota statutory provision that requires a
minor to wait fourty-eight hours after notifying her parents of her decision to have an
abortion. The Court found that delay only imposes a minimum burden on the right of
a minor to seek an abortion. While other factors may cause delays of up to a week or
more, the Court found no evidence to suggest that the statutorily imposed waiting peri-
od greatly added to the delay. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2944 (1990).
63 The Stevens majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and O'Connor.
64 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2938.
65 Id. at 2938.
66 Id. at 2938.
67 Id. at 2938.
68 Id. at 2938.
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the forced notification to the non-custodial parent." The custodi-
al'parent fears that the notification may threaten his or her custo-
dy rights and the custodial parent also experiences resentment at
the need for the non-custodial parent to play a role in the deci-
sion."0 The district court concluded the two parent notification
also adversely affected families where the minor lived with both
parents and family violence occurs."1 The district court reasoned
that minors have difficulty using the exception to parental notifi-
cation where they are subject to sexual or physical abuse because
of the necessity of reporting the abuse to authorities. The district
court then found that the possibility of family violence actually
impairs notification because of the necessity of explaining the
violence to the court.7 2 The communication between the minor
and the parent the minor chooses to notify deteriorates once'the
minor and parent go to court to avoid notifying the second par-
ent. The need to notify the second parent in those circumstances
discussed above actually interferes with the objective of the Min-
nesota statute to foster communications between the minor and
her parents.
2. The Requirement that a Minor Notify Both Parents Furthers
No Legitimate State Interests
The Stevens majority found that the Minnesota statutory re-
quirement that a minor notify both parents serves no particular
state interest in any family situation. The opinion identified a
privacy right possessed by the children and then "carefully as-
sess[ed] the interests of child and parent individually and as fami-
ly members, as well as any justifications for the legislation prof-
fered by the state."" The opinion noted that the justification
most often offered for the two parent requirement is that it
serves to protect the authority of the parents who are best able to
ensure that a minor's decision to seek an abortion is knowing and
deliberate.74 Without finding that parental interest legitimate, the
Stevens majority stated that the" parental interest can be fulfilled
by the minor notifying one parent "who can then seek the coun-
69 Id.
70 .Id. at 2938.
71 Id. at 2944.
72 Id. at 2939.
73 Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme
Court's Approach, 66 U. MINN. L. REv. 459 (1982).
74 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2945.
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sel of his or her mate or any other party, when such advice and
support is deemed necessary to help the child make a difficult
decision." 5 The Stevens majority examined potential family situa-
tions, concluding that two parent notification would not promote
any state interest and in some instances may prove harmful to the
minor and the parents.7 6 The opinion presents a reasoned analy-
sis, balancing the minor's privacy right and the state's interest in
insuring the minor's health and safety."
v
The Stevens majority noted that the state supported the two-
parent notification requirement by stating that a minor should
only make a decision about abortion in consultation with both
parents so that the parents may have an opportunity to determine
what is in the best interest of their minor child.7' The Stevens
majority stated that, while a parent may have an interest in the
minor's abortion decision, the state cannot force communication
between the minor and parent.79 This reasoning is consistent
with prior Court rulings in Bellotti II and Ashcroft. In those deci-
sions, the Court found statutes requiring parental consent consti-
tutional only where the minor has the opportunity to avoid seek-
ing parental consent through a judicial bypass procedure.80 With-
out the judicial bypass procedure, the statutes would have forced
75 Id. at 2945.
76 Id. at 2946. The Stevens majority noted that, in the ideal family situation, notice
to one parent would normally serve as notice to both; therefore, the two-parent notifica-
tion would not further any state interest. The Stevens majority stated that "the State has
no legitimate interest in questioning one parent's judgment that notice to the other
parent would not assist the minor." Where a dysfunctional family unit is involved, the
Stevens majority concluded the two parent notification requirement actually "disserves
the State interest." Id. at 2945. Where the parents are divorced, notification to the par-
ent who does not have custody invades the privacy of the custodial parent and the mi-
nor. In other situations where one parent had abandoned or abused the child, the
Stevens majority noted that the requirement was counterproductive to the state goals
and supported its conclusion with district court testimony of a plaintiff expert. Id. at
2945.
77 The review of the state interests involved has become altered somewhat from the
Danforth ruling where the statute at issue was examined by the Court to determine if the
statute furthered any significant state interest. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-5. Justice Stevens framed the analysis of the two parent notifi-
cation requirement by inquiring if the requirement furthered any "legitimate state inter-
est." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945.
78 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2946.
79 The Stevens majority likened this reasoning to the court's decision in Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), where the court invalidated a zoning requirement
that forced families to live in certain patterns. The majority opinion stated that "the
State has no more interest in requiring all family members to talk with one another
than it has in requiring certain of them to live together." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926,2946.
80 See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
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communication between the minor and parent.
The parental interest in influencing a minor's decision to
seek an abortion does not outweigh the minor's interest where
the minor acts with the consent of the other parent or court.
81
The Stevens majority found support for that proposition from the
rulings in Bellotti H- and Danforth. In Danforth, the Court stated
that the interest proffered by the state did not support the re-
quirement that a mature minor receive parental consent and the
Court concluded that "'[a]ny independent interest the parent may
have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no
more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor
mature enough to have become pregnant."'8  The Bellotti H
Court's holding that the statute there was constitutionally defec-
tive where it required that the minor consult with her parents
even where the minor is mature and independent is "predicated
on the assumption that the justification for any rule requiring
parental involvement in the abortion decision rests entirely on the
best interests of the child.""
Justice Kennedy, in dissenting from Justice Stevens' opinion
that the two parent notification requirement is unconstitutional,
rested his constitutionality argument on Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in the Matheson decision. 4 There, Justice Stevens
stated that the Utah notification statute furthered substantial state
interests.8" The Utah statute provided for notification to the par-
ents or guardian of the minor.8 " While the statute required noti-
fication of the minor's parents, the legal issues were not ground-
ed in the requirement of notice to both parents; rather, Matheson
involved a challenge to the parental notification generally.
87
Thus, the challenge to the Utah statute and the Minnesota statute
differed such that Justice Stevens' opinions in both cases do not
conflict. In this respect Justice Kennedy's dissent was wrong. If a
minor's interest is at least as important as the parental interest,
81 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2946.
82 Id. at 2946 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 75 (1975)).
83 Id. at 2947. The Stevens majority surveyed other federal and state statutory provi-
sions involving the health and welfare of children finding that few required two-parent
notification. Only one other Minnesota statute requires two-parent notification, that
which authorizes a minor to change her name: Id. -at 2947.
84 Id. at 2966 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
86 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7.304(2) (1965).
87 Matheson, 450 U.S. at 407.
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which Danforth indicates, any notification required ought to be
measured by the minor's needs. A minor's needs are best served
by encouraging the minor to seek the advice and counsel of one
parent. A minor does not need the advice of two parents where a
parent can provide sufficient advice and also conclude whether
the other parent should have any input.
3. The Two-Parent Notification Requirement Survives
Constitutional Scrutiny Where the Statute also Provides for a
Judicial Bypass Procedure
Another majority of the Court held that the requirement that
both parents be notified of their daughter's decision to have an
abortion becomes constitutional as a result of the statutory provi-
sion that provides for a judicial bypass procedure should the two-
parent requirement be invalidated."8 Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia,
found that the bypass procedure provided for by the Minnesota
statute fits within the framework developed in earlier Supreme
Court cases.8" As the Minnesota statute's bypass provision com-
ports with the rulings in prior court decisions, the Court's deci-
sion is not surprising.
Justice Kennedy initially recognized that the bypass procedure
provided for by the Minnesota statute accomplished what prior
Court rulings required-it created "a judicial mechanism to iden-
tify, and exempt from the strictures of the law, those cases in
which the minor is mature or in which notification of the minor's
parents is not in the minor's best interests."9 The Bellotti II deci-
sion permitted a two-parent consent requirement where the re-
quirement was coupled with a judicial bypass procedure. 91 In
Matheson, the Court upheld a two-parent notification as applied to
immature minors whose best interests would be served by notifi-
cation in Matheson.92 The Minnesota statute requires that a physi-
cian notify an immature minor's parents where the minor's best
interests are served by the notification but, where the minor is
88 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89 Justice O'Connor also found that the parental notice requirement survived con-
siitutionally when coupled with a judicial bypass procedure. Justice O'Connor stated that
"the interference with the internal operation of the family required by subdivision 2
simply does not exist where the minor can avoid notifying one or both parents by use
of the bypass procedure." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2926.
90 Id. at '2970.
91 See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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mature .or her best interests are not served by notification, then
the judicial bypass is necessary. 9 Justice Kennedy concluded that
the bypass proceeding is the best method to "separate the applica-
tions of the law which are constitutional from those which are
not."
94
Justice Stevens' dissent in Hodgson focused on the minor
having to go to court even where she has notified one parent of
her abortion decision.9 The Bellotti II decision indicates that a
statute requiring consent of both parents is permissible where
accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure. Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the Minnesota statute places an intolerable burden on
the minor.9" Yet, the Minnesota statute, as upheld by the Court,
would require the minor only to notify one parent. The Bellotti II
reasoning would arguably imply a greater burden on the minor
by forcing her to choose between seeking parental consent or
opting for the judicial procedure. As Justice O'Connor indicated,
the judicial bypass procedure as provided for by the Minnesota
statute lessens the state's intrusion into family matters by not
forcing a minor to notify her parents.
B. Akron II: Defining the limits of state power
In Akron II the Sixth Circuit found the Ohio parental notifi-
cation statute unconstitutional due to a number of due process
violations. These violations relate to the following points: 1) the
requirement that a physician notify the parent; 2) the pleading re-
quirements of the bypass proceeding; 3) the burden of proof at
the bypass' proceeding, 4) the bypass procedure's lack of confiden-
tiality; 5) the procedure's lack of expedition; and 6) the statute's
93 See supra note 41.
94 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2971.
95 Id. at 2948-49.
96 Id. at 2949. Justice Marshall dissenting separately with Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, argued that the bypass procedure could not cure the constitutional defects of
the two-parent notification requirement. He argued that even a one-parent notification
requirement would inflict great harm on the minor by leading to a "family crisis, charac-
terized by severe parental anger and rejection." Id. at 2953. He further argued that the
bypass procedure itself was constitutionally invalid because it gives "'an absolute veto
over the decision of the physician and his patient.'" Id. at 2957 (quoting Planned Parent-
hood Assn. of Kansas City, 462 U.S. 476, 504 (1983)). Justice Marshall ignores the spe-
cial relationship that the state has with its minor citizens. A state must insure that a
minor receives guidance from either parents or the state in making a decision of such
great importance. The parental notification provisions coupled with judicial bypass proce-
dures appear to most efficiently balance the minor's interests, the parent's right to influ-
ence his or her child, and the state's right to insure minors are protected.
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"pocket authorization" provision. 7 As is set out below, the Sixth
Circuit's arguments are flawed in their reasoning and have been
rejected by the Supreme Court.
1. REQUIREMENT THAT PHYsIcIAN NOTIFY THE PARENT
The Ohio parental notification statute requires that the per-
son performing the abortion on a minor be the one who provides
parental notification. The Sixth Circuit indicated that this require-
ment "unduly burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. ""8 In
reaching this conclusion, the court argued that the state made no
showing that its interests were advanced by requiring that a physi-
cian, rather than another responsible person, provide parental
notification.9
There are several flaws in the court's conclusion regarding
the requirement that the physician notify the minor's parents. In
prior abortion cases, it has been stressed that abortion decisions
should be made by the woman in conjunction with her physi-
cian."'0 The Sixth Circuit itself stated that the Supreme Court
has "appeared hostile to the notion that any party other than the
expectant mother and her physician should be a party to the
abortion decision." '' Because of the close relationship between
the expectant mother and her physician, it seems logical that
parental notification should be the physician's responsibility. Sec-
ond, even if the state has not advanced a reason for this require-
ment, it does not appear to place any greater burden on the
minor than having adults other than the physician effectuate notifi-
cation."2 The burden on the minor's right is notification. This
burden has already been validated by the Supreme Court1°s and
97 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1989).
The district court had invalidated the statute on these grounds. In addition, the district
court had found the statute's venue provisions unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit dis-
agreed with the lower court on the last issue.
98 Id. at 861.
99 Id: at 862.
100 "[T]he abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judge-
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." RQe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165
(1973).
101 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 854 F.2d at 857.
102 A law requiring a physician to effectuate notification that is not supported by a
state interest may place a burden on the physician's right to perform abortions. But, the
burden on the physician's rights was not at issue in this case.
103 "[A] statute setting out a 'mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate
the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 409 (1981) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Bellotti II).
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will remain in place regardless of who provides notification. Final-
ly, and most significantly, in H.L. v. Matheson, the Supreme Court
upheld a Utah law that required the physician to effectuate no-
tification.
1 0 4
The Supreme Court cited Matheson in rejecting the conten-
tion that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional because of the re-
quirement of physician notification. The Court stressed that re-
quiring a physician to effectuate notification serves the valuable
purpose of providing important medical data to .the physician.
"An adequate medical and psychological case history is important
to the physician. Parents can provide medical and psychological
data, refer the physician to other sources of medical history, such
as family physicians, and authorize family physicians to give rele-
vant data.""'5 The Court also pointed out that physician notifica-
tion may facilitate better advice being given from parent to
child." 6 In addition the Court recognized that requiring the
physician to provide notification is not overly burdensome on the
physician.
10 7
2. Bypass Proceeding Pleading Requirements
The Sixth Circuit, in its Akron II decision, argued that the
bypass proceeding's pleading requirements created a "procedural
trap" by forcing the pregnant minor to choose one of the three
complaint forms.' In Bellotti II, the Court indicated that in a
bypass proceeding the court must determine if the minor is ma-
ture or if she is not mature, whether an abortion is in her best
interest.'0 9 The lower court contended that because only one of
the Ohio complaint forms permits a judge to consider both the
maturity and best interests of the minor, the Ohio statute does
not meet the standards of Bellotti II.11°
The Sixth Circuit's Akron II decision incorrectly held the
104 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
105 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 2983 (1990) (Ak-
ron II) (citing Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411).
106 "The parent who must respond to an event with complex philosophical and emo-
tional dimensions is given some access to an experienced and in an ideal case, detached
physician who can assist the parent in approaching the problem in a mature and bal-
anced way. This access may benefit both the parent and child in a manner not possible
through notice by less qualified persons." Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 2983.
107 Id.
108 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 863.
109 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
110 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 863.
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pleading requirements to be unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit
correctly cites Bellotti II as establishing the requirement that even
if a court finds a minor too immature to make the decision on
her own it must determine whether an abortion is nonetheless in
the minor's best interest. The court held that the Ohio law failed
to comply with Bellotti Ir's mandate and failed to advance a valid
state interest for not doing so."' Although the law does in fact
create pleadings that would allow a court to pass only on the
issues of maturity or the minor's best interest, the minor is in no
way restricted to those pleadings. The minor may at her discre-
tion elect to file complaint form C, which requires the court to
enter a Bellotti II style judgement.
In allowing the minor to choose her complaint, Ohio was
effectively advancing the interests of the minor. Consideration of
the Ohio law in its entirety reveals the state interest, expedition
of the proceedings, that the court said was missing. 12 The stat-
ute evinces a concerted effort by the Ohio legislature to expedite
the bypass procedure. By having the judge pass only on the dis-
puted facts the Legislature was attempting to shorten the proceed-
ing. Ironically, the court gave failure to expedite the proceeding
as a separate grounds for invalidating the statute.'
1 3
The Supreme Court also rejected the "procedural trap" argu-
ment on two grounds. First, the Court stated that while the plead-
ing requirement might cause confusion in an unrepresented mi-
nor, "[i]t seems unlikely that the Ohio courts will treat a minor's
choice of complaint form without due care and understanding for
her unrepresented status" '14 . Second, the Court noted that the
"minor does not make a binding election by the initial choice of
pleading form."" 5 As noted above 6, the Ohio law actually ad-
vances the interests of the minor by allowing her to expedite the
111 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 862-3.
112 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(C)(1)-(2) (Anderson Supp. 1988) contain the
provisions that govern a court's actions if a minor files a complaint that alleges either
maturity or best interest. A court finding in favor of the minor enters judgement imme-
diately. Section (3) provides instructions to the court should the minor plead both
counts. If the court finds in favor of the minor in the first count it considers, it imme-
diately enters judgement. The sections, considered together, indicate an intent on the
part of the legislature to have a court pass only on contested issues. The immature mi-
nor could therefore ask a court to consider only whether abortion was in her best inter-
est. The result is a shorter process.
113 See Akron II, 854 F.2d at 866-68.
114 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2982.
115 Id.
116 See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
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proceeding by eliminating areas from judicial consideration. .At
the same time, because the initial selection may-be changed after
consultation with appointed counsel, the minor is protected from
making an immature decision.
3. Standard of Proof
The Ohio statute requires a minor to prove by "clear and
convincing" evidence either that she is mature or that an abortion
is in her best interest." The Sixth Circuit, in Akron II, found
that this standard of proof threatened a minor's right to proceed
with an abortion without parental intervention."' 1In this section
of its decision the court examined the competing interests which
underlie the entire issue of parental notification or consent.,
The Sixth Circuit made several references to abortion as a
fundamental right.' Contrary to other courts that have passed
on this issue, as-well as to its earlier statements,120 the court
seems to have placed the minor's right to an abortion or the
same level as an adult's right. By characterizing the minors' right
as "fundamental," the lower court discounted the state's interest
and concluded that the heightened burden of proof is "unconstitu-
tional. 1
2
Bellotti 11 pointed out that "although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against govern-
mental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs
for 'concern, . . . sympathy, . . . and parental attention."
1 22
Based on this language the clear and convincing stindard was a
valid adjustment to the state's legal system. As mentioned above,
the Sixth Circuit, in Akron II, gave little weight to the state's inter-
ests. The court stated that "the only possible interest that the
state may assert ... is to ensure that the proceeding is fair and
yields a reliable result."'123 In Bellotti II, Justice Powell's plurality
opinion 24 pointed out that "minors often lack the experience,
117 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 C(I), (2) (Anderson 1985).
118 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 864.
119 "[A] woman's right to obtain a first trimester abortion is a fundamental one." Id.
at 863.
'120 "[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that, under certain circumstances, parental
intervention is appropriate when the abortion decision is made by a minor." Id. at 857.
121 Id.
122 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635, (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)).
123 Akron I, 854 F.2d at 864.
124 Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
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perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them."1'2 Therefore, the state apparent-
ly has a substantial interest in insuring that immature minors do
not make the choice to have an abortion. In order to advance
this interest, the state should be able to require the minor to
meet the "clear and convincing" standard of proof.
In Akron II, the Supreme Court, citing Bellotti II, pointed out
that a state may require the minor to prove maturity or best in-
terest in a bypass proceeding. 26 In addition, "[a] state ... may
require a heightened standard of proof when, as here, the bypass
procedure contemplates an ex parte proceeding at which no one
opposes the minor's testimony and she is assisted by an attorney
and a guardian ad litem.'
7
4. Confidentiality
The Ohio bypass proceeding's complaint form requires the
minor to sign her name at the end of the petition unless she is
represented by an attorney. 2 1 The Sixth Circuit, in Akron II,
found this requirement to be a violation of the rule of anonymity
set out in Bellotti 11.129 Because the Ohio law fails to ensure ano-
nymity, the Sixth Circuit held that the statute's provisions dealing
with this subject are unconstitutional.
It is difficult to contest the lower court's argument relating to
confidentiality. But, there is an interpretation of Planned Parent-
hood v. Ashcroft3 ' that does contradict the Sixth Circuit's posi-
tion. Ashcroft examined a Missouri statute that allowed the minor
to use her initials on the petition for judicial bypass. The statute
Rehnquist.
125 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635.
126 Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2981.
127 Id.
128 The actual requirement that a minor sign the complaint appears nowhere in the
text of the statute. This requirement was added by the Ohio Supreme Court Clerk pur-
suant to the requirement (found in the statute) that he draft the complaint forms. Rath-
er than address the issue of amending the court-created complaint form, the court found
the statute itself unconstitutional.
129 In Bellotti II, Justice Powell stated that a bypass procedure "must assure that a
resolution of the issue ... will be completed with anonymity." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at
644. This anonymity requirement has been reiterated in numerous cases. See Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532, 1542 (7th Cir. 1985); American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1984), ajFd on other grounds, 476
U.S. 747 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Atlanta v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971 (N.D.
Ga. 1987). "
130 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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also required the minor or minor's "next friend" to sign the peti-
tion."'1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit stated that it was "satisfied that anonymity is sufficiently pro-
tected by these procedures, which do not require the minor to
disclose her name."3'3 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the circuit court.3 3 The Ohio procedure requires the minor
to sign her complaint unless she is represented by an attorney.
Thus, procedures that allow the minor to use a pseudonym and
do not require her to- disclose her name sufficiently protect ano-
nymity. One criticism of the. above argument might be that poor
women will not be able to afford, attorneys, and therefore will be
forced to sign the complaint form. Nonetheless, the anonymity
requirement is satisfied as long as the statute does not require
the minor to disclose her name. On its face, the Ohio statute
clearly does not require disclosure in all cases. In addition, it
cannot successfully be contended that the state is required to
make abortions as convenient as possible for all women. Supreme
Court cases that have denied federal aid to women seeking abor-
tions have a much more direct effect on the rights of poor wom-
en to obtain abortions than does the Ohio statute at issue.'34 A
poor woman denied federal aid may have her right to an abor-
tion completely cut off. Even if a poor minor is completely un-
able to obtain legal aid (a proposition that seems unlikely in most
cases), she may still be able to obtain an abortion under the Ohio
statute.
Also, while the minor may be called on to sign the complaint
form, Ohio H.B. 319 calls for confidentiality in the bypass pro-
ceedings. "Each hearing under this section shall be conducted in a
manner that will preserve the anonymity of the complainant. The
complaint and all other papers and records that pertain to an
action commenced under this section shall be kept confidential
and are not public records."'35 In citing the above 'language, the
Supreme Court held that the Ohio procedure sa'tisfies Bellotti I's
anonymity requirement.
3 6
131 Mo. REv. STAT. § 188028 (1986). The statute provides: "The petition shall be
signed by the minor or her next friend." Id.
132 Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 860 (8th Cir. 1981) (em-
phasis added).
133 Ashcrof, 462 U.S. 476.
134 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 348 (1977).
135 Ohio H.B. 319 section 2151.851(f).
136 "We refuse to base a decision on the facial validity of a statute on the mere
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The Supreme Court, in Akron II, also seems to have pulled
back from Bellotti II's anonymity requirement. The Court stated:
"We do not find complete anonymity critical. '137 This statement
indicates that a statute will be upheld as long as it prohibits pub-
lic disclosure of the minor's identity.
5. Expedition of the Proceedings
The Sixth Circuit, in Akron 11, also deemed the bypass proce-
dure unconstitutional for failing to adequately expedite the .ap-
peals process.3 8 The court determined that the statute permit-
ted a possible delay of twenty-two days (including Saturdays and
Sundays) between the initiation of the procedure by the minor
and the completion of the final appellate disposition.3 This de-
lay, opined the lower court, unduly burdened the right of a mi-
nor to terminate the pregnancy.1 40 The lower court, in arriving
at twenty-two days correctly included Saturdays and Sundays when
calculating the delay experienced by the minor. Nonetheless, the
court did not include Saturdays and Sundays as days chargeable
to the time limits allowable to the state in the appellate process.
The Sixth Circuit effectively interpreted Ohio law to allow the
state more time to process the appeal than was intended by the
Ohio legislature. According to the court, an allowance of four
days to docket the appeal would result in a net delay of six days
if a weekend fell within the four days. Holding the state responsi-
ble for those days would produce only a delay of four days.
When applied throughout the appellate process, counting week-
ends would result in only a sixteen-day delay. 141 As justification,
the court cites Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 14,142 which
stipulates that weekends and holidays are not counted as days
possibility of an unauthorized, illegal disclosure by state employees." Akivn 11, 110 S. Ct.
at 2980.
137 Id.
138 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 866-68.
139 Id. at 866.
140 Id. at 867. The court recognized the delay most minors experience in initially
discovering the pregnancy. A further delay, even of twenty-two days, could push the
abortion into the second trimester of the pregnancy. The court expressed concern that a
state's interest in regulating abortion is greater in the second trimester, and the delay
could subject the minor to even greater state regulation. The Supreme Court's plurality
opinion in Webster questions the validity of the trimester system which draws this court's
reasoning into question.
141 See Note, H.B. 319: Ohio Adopts An Abortion Notification Statute, 12 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 205, 219 n.134 [hereinafter Note].
142 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 866 n.8. See Note, supra note 140 at 217.
[Vol. 66:527
NOTE - MINOR ABORTION STATUTES
chargeable to a party for purposes of Ohio civil practice.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of the delay issue is flawed. First,
the court improperly failed to suspend application of Ohio Appel-
late Rule 14, which does in fact hold that only business days
count toward calculation of time periods. Although the rule
would result in a possible delay of twenty-two days, if facially
applied the Ohio Constitution suspends application of the rule in
cases like the present.4 Article IV, section 5 only empowers
the Ohio Supreme Court to make rules of procedure that in no
way "abridge" or "modify" a citizens substantive rights. 44 To the
extent that a civil or appellate rule abridges a right, Ohio courts
have held it inapplicable.' 45 In the present context, the Ohio
cbnstitution would suspend Appellate Rule 14, because its applica-
tion would, in the opinion of the court, create a burdensome de-
lay. The Sixth Circuit even admitted that there is 'some dispute





Second, the statute itself clearly indicates the Ohio
legislature's intent that weekends be chargeable to the state.
4
1
The statute dictates that a minor's initial hearing will be held "not
later than the fifth business day after"14 the complaint is filed.
The guidelines for docketing the appeal then refer only to "four
days"'14 and the time limit for rendering a decision is simply
"five days." 50 After using the word "business" in the initial limi-
tation, the legislature's omission of the word "business" in appel-
late time frames indicates the intent to count all days (Weekends
included) and not just business days.
A proper application of Ohio law would allow a possible
delay of only sixteen days. A delay of sixteen days is likely to be
constitutionally permissible under the United States Supreme
Court's rule in Ashcroft. The Ashcroft Court upheld a Missouri
143 See Note, supra note 140, at 217. The Ohio Constitution limits the rulemaking
ability of the Ohio Supreme Court to rules of practice and procedure. This bars sub-
stantive rulemaking. Id.
144 Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B).
145 See Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1986); Krause v. State,
31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 739 (1972).
146 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 866 n.8.
147 See, Note, supra note 140, at 216-17. The Note provides an excellent analysis of
the interaction of H.B. 319 with the Ohio Constitution and procedural rules.
148 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 B(1) (Anderson 1985) (emphasis added).
149 Id. § 2505.073 A.
150 Id.
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statute that called upon the Missouri Supreme Court to "provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed"'51 under the
bypass proceeding. Although the statute did not specifically
identify time limits, the parties to Akron II stipulated, and the
circuit court seemed to concur, that the "framework created by
Missouri law at the time of the Ashcroft decision envisioned a
process spanning sixteen or seventeen days ... "152 Thus, a
proper calculation of the delay would result in it being deter-
mined to be constitutional.
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo the court was correct in its
calculation of the time period, its determination of unconstitution-
ality is incorrect. To support its position, the Sixth Circuit cites
two district court decisions that found three weeks to be an im-
proper delay.15 The only guidance from the Supreme Court
came in Bello'tti II, where the plurality ruled that the proceeding
be held with "sufficient expedition to provide an effective oppor-
tunity for an abortion to be obtained."154 Given the limits on a
state's ability to restrict abortion during the first two trimesters,
the opportunity for an abortion will not be rendered any less
effective by the passage of an additional five days (the difference
between the lower court's twenty-two days and Ashcroft's seven-
teen). Admittedly, the line must be drawn somewhere, but if pos-
sible a statute should be construed favoring constitutionality. 55
The lower court's worst-case analysis of the Ohio statute produced
only a "possible twenty-two day delay," '156 and even that delay is
arguably permissible.
The Supreme Court's decision is in agreement with the above
analysis. In addressing the expediti6n issue, the Court first point-
ed out that the Court of Appeals' calculation of twenty-two days
was "dubious."'57 The Court also criticized the lower court's
151 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(6) (Vernon 1983).
152 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 867.
153 Id. at 868 (citing American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh, 656 F. Supp. 879, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1987) and Glick v. McKay, 616 F. Supp.
322, 326 (D.Nev. 1985).
154 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644.
155 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Webster suggests a strong presumption
of constitutionality. She asserts that to find a statute unconstitutional, a challenger must
prove that under no circumstances will the statute function constitutionally. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3060 (1989).
156 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 868.
157 The Court stated "Interpreting the term 'days' in section 2505.073(A) to mean
business days instead of calendar days seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of
the express and contrasting use of 'business day[s]' in section 2151.85(B)(1)." Akron II,
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"worst-case" analysis. 5 ' Finally, the Court pointed out that based
on its prior decisions (the Court specifically cited Ashcroft's ap-
proval of a seventeen-day delay), the twenty-two days is "plainly
insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face."
59
6. The "Pocket Authorization" Provision
Under the Ohio statute if the court does not hold a hearing
within five business days after ihe complaint is filed, the minor
may proceed with an abortion without parental notification.
6 0
In addition, if the court of appeals does not act upon the petition
within five days after it is docketed, the minor may proceed with-
out -notification.16 ' The Sixth Circuit found these provisions un-
constitutional because they place an undue burden on the minor's
right to an abortion. The court reasoned that when "pocket au-
thorization" is given, the minor has "nothing tangible to show the
physician in support of her authority to proceed in the absence
of parental or express judicial authorization."162 The physician,
therefore, will not risk the penalties associated with violating the
parental notification law and will not perform the abortion.
I Based on the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, there is little doubt
that the Ohio "pocket authorization" provision burdens the
minor's right to an abortion. Nonetheless, the provision arguably
does not create an undue burden. In Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,'63 the Court upheld a Missouri statute which re-
quired, a physician to perform a viability test on women whom
"he has reason to believe" are carrying unborn children of twenty
or more -weeks gestational age.164 Just as with the Ohio parental
notification statute, there were penalties associated with the vio-
lation of the Missouri law.'65 Following the logic of the Sixth
Circuit, one might conclude that Missouri physicians will be more
110 S. Ct. at 2980.
158 The Court criticized: "[B]ecause appellees are making a facial challenge to a stat-
ute, they must show that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.' The Court of Appeals should not have Invalidated the Ohio statute on a facial
challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur." Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at
2980-81 (citing Webster, 109 S. Ct at 3060).
159 Ak;on 11, 110 S. Ct. at 2981.
160 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 B(1) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
161 Id. at § 2505.073 A.
162 Akron II, 854 F.2d at 868.
163 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
164 Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986).
165 A violation of § 188.029 is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 188.075.
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reluctant to perform abortions in the face of uncertain require-
ments that carry penalties for their violation. Thus, the statute
creates an undue burden on the right to an abortion.
In Webster, the Supreme Court did not adopt such an analy-
sis. The plurality opinion 161 stressed that the statute permissibly
furthered a legitimate state interest. 167 Justice O'Connor, concur-
ring, indicated that "requiring the performance of examinations
and tests useful to determine whether a fetus is viable . . . does
not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion deci-
sion.
168
Under the Ohio statute, the pocket authorization does not
unduly burden the minor's right to an abortion. While it is true
that physicians will not likely proceed with an abortion based
solely on the minor's statement that she has pocket authorization,
it would not take a great deal of effort for a physician to verify
such statements. To avoid the penaltie associated with the Ohio
statute, the physician would merely have to verify the minor's
story by contacting the court in which the complaint was filed.
Such contact would not breach any requirements of confidentiality
because the physician obviously knows the identity of the preg-
nant minor. It seems naive to assume that physicians will forego
the profits associated with the performance of abortions based
solely on the effect of the "pocket approval" provision.
Even assuming that the Sixth Circuit's argument is correct,
finding the "pocket authorization" provision unconstitutional
should not lead to the downfall of the entire parental notification
statute. Under Ohio law, "[iflf any provision of a section of the
Revised Code ... is held invalid, the invalidity does not-affect
other provisions or applications of the section . . . which can be
given effect without the invalid provision. " "' The pocket autho-
rization provision could be severed from the remaining sections
without affecting the implementation of the latter.
Again, the Supreme Court also rejected the pocket authoriza-
tion challenge. The Court recognized that a physician can easily
verify that a state court has given the pocket authorization. 71 In
addition, the Court pointed out that it expected the Ohio courts
166 The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White and
Kennedy.
167 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
168 Id. at 3063.
169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.50 (Anderson 1989).
170 Id.
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to comply with the statute's time limitations.17' The pocket au-
thorization is simply a method of ensuring expedition. In this
sense it may be seen as protecting the minor's rights rather than
unduly burdening them.
4,
V. BEYOND HODGSON AND AKRON ff: INCREASING LEVELS OF
STATE REGULATION
The Court has spawned an era of increasing state regulation
of abortion. Its decision in Webster recognized a growing state
interest in restricting a woman's right to an abortion. Its subse-
quent decisions in Hodgson and Akron II exemplify the Court's
growing toleration of restrictions 'on'a minor's right to an abor-
tion.
The Court in Hodgson creates a broad range of permissible
state regulation' of a minor's right to an abortion. The Court
recognized that the "Minnesota statute is the most intdusive in the
Nation."'7 2 It nonetheless found the major portion of the statute
constitutional, based largely on the availability of the by-pass pro-
ceeding. This suggests that a state might impose' stringent limita-
tions on a minor's right to an abortion, provided it affords the
minor an opportunity to avoid the limitations through a by-pass
proceeding. This flexible approach recognizes and accommodates
the states' interest in protecting immature minors from their own
immaturity, yet protects the rights of the mature minor from state
and parental interference.Akron I also shows the .Court's willingness to recognize the
states' interest. By rejecting each of' the Sixth Circuit's six grounds
for declaring Ohio's by-pass proceeding unconstitutional, the
Court significantly lessened the states' burden in administering
the by-pass system. The states now have wider latitude in defining
a minor's procedural rights. Only when those procedural rights
truly, burden the minor's right to an abortion will they be found
infirm.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Hodgson, states are now relatively free to restrict a
minor's right to an abortion, provided it allows a minor to seek
court intervention to avoid the restrictions. This approach balanc-
171 Id.
172 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931, n.5 (emphasis added).
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es the states' interest in the advancing the family as a unit with
the minor's fundamental privacy rights. The result will be exten-
sive case-by-case determinations by the courts. So long as the
states are willing to provide the resources needed to expeditiously
adjudicate each minor's case, their restrictions will be honored.
Given the Hodgson Court's reliance on the by-pass proceeding
to justify broader state restrictions, the adequacy of by-pass pro-
ceedings will be an area of extensive litigation in the future.
The possible points of controversy are endless. The Ohio statute
involved in the Akron II case, for example, raised six separate con-
stitutional issues. Each state will enact its own laws with its own
bypass proceeding, and each will be the subject of strict constitu-
tional scrutiny. The fact that the Supreme Court summarily reject-
ed all six of the Sixth Circuit's constitutional violations in Akron II
is indicative of increased latitude allowed to the states; however,
unless the statute involved is identical to the Ohio statute, the
lower courts will be free determine whether its provisions unduly
burden a minor's right to an abortion.
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